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ANTITRUST
Dando B. Cellini*
INTRODUCTION

Since 1977, the number of antitrust cases filed in federal district
courts for the most part has declined each year. Despite this trend, a
healthy number of such cases continue to .be filed. In the twelve months
prior to September 30, 1983, a total of 1,196 antitrust cases crossed
the intake desks of federal district courts around the country. In the
same twelve-month period, a wide range of noteworthy decisions were
handed down by the United States Supreme Court and the various
Courts of Appeals, the bulk of which dealt with issues of standing and
immunity.
ANTITRUST

STANDING

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a treble damage remedy to
''any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . ."I On its face section
4 is very broad; read literally it is expansive enough to encompass any
injury that can directly or indirectly be considered a consequence of an
antitrust violation. 2 The Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy for all injuries
that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust violation. 3 Rather,
Section 4 claims are to be considered in light of the statutory purposes
behind awarding treble damages: to deter antitrust violators, to deprive
them of the fruits of their illegality, and to compensate their victims
4
for injuries suffered.
The Supreme Court has developed two types of limitations on the
availability of the section 4 remedy which courts must consider when
deciding whether a treble damage action may be maintained.'

Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1983)).
2. Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 F.2d 958, 962 (3d Cir. 1983).
3. Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 92 S. Ct. 885
(1972).
4. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 98 S. Ct. 584 (1978).
5. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 473, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2545-46 (1982).
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Indirect Purchaser Rule
The first limitation on Section 4 damage actions is drawn from
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.6 In Illinois Brick, the Court held that
indirect purchasers in a chain of distribution were precluded from bringing a damage action based on overcharges passed through to them by
the direct purchasers of the alleged price-fixing manufacturers. 7 The
Court relied on two distinct policies to conclude that a section 4 action
was unavailable. First, it focused on the risk of duplicative recovery
created by allowing every person in a chain of distribution to claim
damages arising from a single illegal transaction.' Second, it sought to
avoid burdening section 4 actions with damages issues necessitating massive evidence and complicated theories, thereby discouraging vigorous
private enforcement of the antitrust laws. 9 Applying these policies, the
Court concluded that it was inconsistent with the broader remedial
purposes of the antitrust laws to allow indirect purchasers to maintain
a treble damage action.
In In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litigation,'0 the State of
Illinois brought suit against defendant milk cooperatives, alleging that
they had conspired to fix the prices of raw milk in the Chicago marketing
area. During the pendency of that case, Illinois Brick was decided.
Thereafter, the lower court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the basis of Illinois Brick and denied the plaintiff leave
to file an amended complaint.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit accepted that plaintiff desired to allege
a vertical conspiracy among the cooperative and the suppliers from
whom plaintiff purchased. The plaintiff argued that because the suppliers
were alleged to be co-conspriators, the general rule of Illinois Brick
barring proof of "passing on" could be avoided. The Eighth Circuit
held that it need not decide the issue because the alleged co-conspirator
middlemen were not named as parties defendant. Absent joinder of the
middlemen, the Court reasoned that the rule forbidding one antitrust
conspirator from maintaining an action against another for damages
arising from the joint activity would not protect the defendants from
the risk of duplicative recovery." In so holding, the Court followed the
Fifth Circuit in In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation2 and at least
one decision of the Ninth Circuit. 3 A different Ninth Circuit panel

6.
7.

431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
Id. at 746, 97 S. Ct. at 2075.

8. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S, Ct. at 2546.
9. Id. n.1l.
10. 730 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1984).

11.

Id. at 530.

12.

600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).

13.

In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691

F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 972 (1984).

1984]

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84

reached a contrary conclusion in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT ContinentalBaking Co.,14 holding that the plaintiff was not required
to sue nor even to name all of the alleged conspirators inasmuch as
antitrust co-conspirators are jointly and severally liable for all damages
caused by the conspiracy. 5
In Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 6 the Ninth Circuit, virtually
ignoring the issue of necessity of joinder, held that the Illinois Brick
rule does not apply where a consumer class alleges a conspiracy among
a supplier (who also distributes at the retail level) and intermediate
suppliers to fix retail prices. Shamrock involved a suit by a class of
consumers against several Arizona dairy product producers. Four other
classes of plaintiffs, including a class composed of intermediate grocery
stores, originally existed; all but the consumer class settled. The plaintiffs
alleged claims for overcharges in sales of dairy products through grocery
stores, and for overcharges in direct sales by the defendant in home
delivery. The original focus of the complaint was on a wholesale pricefixing conspiracy.
Shamrock filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the claims
for overcharges passed through grocery stores based on Illinois Brick.
The plaintiffs responded that they had changed their theory of recovery
to allege that the retail intermediaries, the grocery stores, were coconspirators with the defendant producers to fix the price of dairy
products at the retail level. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
that in these circumstances recovery does not depend on a pass-on theory
and that the Illinois Brick bar did not apply. The court reasoned that
no danger of duplicative recovery existed since the consumers attacked
only that overcharge resulting from a retail price-fixing conspiracy. Moreover, it found that for the same reason there would be no necessity
for the complicated allocations sought to be avoided in Illinois Brick.
Finally, it found that there would be no need to apportion the alleged
overcharge because it was not passed on to the consumers through any
other level in the distribution chain.
The Shamrock decision tears a wide hole in the fabric of the Illinois
Brick bar to recovery. Especially in the pleading stage of litigation,
plaintiff consumers now have a loophole to avoid dismissal by casting
their pleadings not as a conspiracy among manufacturers, but as a
conspiracy to fix retail prices involving intermediary suppliers selling
directly to the plaintiffs.
Perhaps the Shamrock holding can be attributed to the fact that
the defendant was engaged in dual distribution, and thus a horizontal
competitor of its alleged co-conspirators. Horizontal price-fixing is a
classic per se restraint of trade; the status of vertical price-fixing is less
14. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
15. Id.at 1052-53.
16. 729 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).
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clear. 7 Although the Shamrock court stated in dicta that Illinois Brick
would be no bar even if the plaintiffs had claimed a two-tier or vertical
conspiracy, allegations of this type would certainly present a weaker
case for plaintiffs.
It is worth noting in passing that the Illinois Brick holding prompted
Senator Slade Gordon (R-Wash.) to propose legislation which would
allow the federal government and the states, indirect buyers for the
most part, to bring suit to recover overcharges. The bill has naturally
received strong support from state attorney generals, but has been opposed by the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Litigation."
Remoteness
The second limitation on section 4 damage actions identified by the
Supreme Court is analytically distinct from the issue of what class of
persons can sue for treble damages. It involves the "conceptually more
difficult question 'of which persons have sustained injuries too remote
[from an antitrust violation] to give them standing to sue . ... "'19
Limitation of this sort "has proven to be less than an empirical
judicial science" 20 and has resulted in "doctrinal confusion."'" Proof
of causation-in-fact is insufficient to support a Section 4 action; beyond
this, however, nothing is clear. Courts have adopted a variety of different, often conflicting, tests to determine when a plaintiff's alleged
injury is to be considered remote from, or only indirectly caused by,
the anticompetitive conduct. 2 2 One approach, adopted by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, is the "target area" test, under which the plaintiff
has to establish that it is within that area of the economy endangered
by a breakdown of competitive conditions, and that the illegal activity
was aimed at it.23 Another test, referred to as the "direct injury test,"
focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. If
the plaintiff is separated from the defendant by one or more intermediate

17. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
18. S. 915, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1165, at 961-62 (May 17, 1984).
19. Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 476, 102 S. Ct. at 2547.
20. Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1081 (6th Cir.
1983).
21. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
22. See id. at 515-16.
23. In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1982);
Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1980); In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 129 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Calderone Enter. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tiers of victims, that plaintiff lacks standing. 24 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, reasoning that both tests demanded too much from plaintiffs
at the pleading stage, has adopted a less restrictive standing test under
which a person pleading (1) injury in fact, and (2) an interest arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute had standing.2 5
This "zone of interests" test essentially engrafted a constitutional, or
26
Article III, definition of standing into antitrust law.
The Supreme Court stepped directly into the standing arena for the
first time in Blue Shield v. McCready.2 7 McCready involved a health
plan authorizing reimbursement for psychotherapy services provided by
psychiatrists, but not by psychologists. Plaintiff patient class sued Blue
Shield, alleging that it had conspired with a group of psychiatrists to
boycott psychologists. Although the Court took note of the varying tests
2
for standing, it declined to evaluate or adopt any particular approach. 1
The Court held that the plaintiff class had standing, concluding that
the plaintiff was within the area of the economy endangered by the
breakdown of competitive conditions. It further held that the plaintiff's
injury was "inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators
sought to inflict on psychologists," and therefore was "squarely within
the area of congressional concern" since the injury was a "necessary
step" and the "means" employed by the conspirators to achieve their

anticompetitive end .29
The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on standing is contained
in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters.° The Court denied standing to a union of carpenters who
had alleged that defendant building contractors had restrained trade in
the market for construction contracting by coercing landowners and
developers to enter into construction contracts with non-union contractors
and subcontractors. This allegedly reduced the business of union contractors and subcontractors, which in turn diminished the business activities of plaintiff union. As in McCready, the Court reviewed the
different standing tests, concluding that "these labels may lead to contradictory and inconsistent results," and that it is "virtually impossible
to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case." 3'
The Court thus closed the door on further attempts to mold a castiron test and adopted a fluid approach, analogizing to the traditional
24. See, e.g., Repp. v. F.E.L. Publications, Ltd., 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982); Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
25. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
26. Southaven Land Co., 715 F.2d at 1082.
27. 457 U.S. 465, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
28. Id. at 475 n.l1, 102 S. Ct. at 2546-47 n.ll.
29. Id. at 484, 102 S. Ct. at 2551.
30. 45 U.S. 519, 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
31. Id. at 536 & n.33, 103 S. Ct. at 908 & n.33.
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common law principles of proximate cause. The courts must evaluate,
as in all common law damage litigation, the plaintiff's harm, the alleged
wrongdoing by the defendants and the relationship between them.3 2 The
Court cautioned that the section 4 inquiry is distinct from the constitutional standing inquiry:
The label "antitrust standing" has traditionally been applied to
some of the elements of this inquiry. As commentators have
observed, the focus of the doctrine of "antitrust standing" is
somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional
doctrine. Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy
the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but
the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff
is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action.33
The factors identified as relevant include (1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiff, and whether that
harm was intended; (2) the nature of the plaintiff's alleged injury,
including the status of the plaintiff as consumer or competitor in the
relevant market; (3) the directness or indirectness of the injury, and the
related inquiry of whether the damages are speculative; (4) the potential
for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages; and (5)
4
the existence of more direct victims of the alleged antitrust violation.
The Associated General test is "further illuminated by the Supreme
Court's actions in three circuit cases in which certiorari had been requested." 35 In the two cases in which antitrust standing was upheld,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for further
consideration in light of Associated General. 6 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in the third case, in which the Court of Appeals affirmed a
37
judgment for the defendants on the basis of lack of standing.
The courts did not take the hint in the two cases vacated and remanded
by the Court. In Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui &
Co.,38 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had conspired to restrain
trade between American competitors by preventing the plaintiffs from
obtaining a source of supply of logs for their business of importation
of lumber into the United States. The Fifth Circuit twice reversed the
lower court's summary judgment for the defendants, the second time
applying the target area test to hold that the plaintiff had standing.
32. Id. at 535, 103 S. Ct. at 907.
33. Id. at 535 n.31, 103 S. Ct. at 907 n.31.
34. Id.at 537-46, 103 S. Ct. at 908-13.
35. McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1374 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984).
36. H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 460 U.S. 1007, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983); Mitsui &
Co. v. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp., 460 U.S. 1007, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
37. Bichan v. Chemetron Coip., 460 U.S. 1016, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
38. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982).
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This decision was vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Associated General.3 9 Although it had "no
difficulty in reaffirming [its] former judgment," the Fifth Circuit did
acknowledge that its prior discussion of standing "was faulty." "Whether
or not the inquiry is termed 'antitrust standing,' the Court teaches the
appropriateness of an initial evaluation of plaintiff's harm, the alleged
wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them tested
' 40
by the Court's explication of relevant factors of antitrust redress."
4
1
In Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co. (Ostrofe 1), the plaintiff, a former
marketing director for the defendant, a manufacturer of paper lithograph
labels, alleged that the defendant had engaged in an illegal conspiracy
with other manufacturers to fix prices and allocate markets. The plaintiff
further alleged that he was compelled to resign after refusing to cooperate
in the conspiracy, and that he was boycotted from further employment
in the market. The Court of Appeals originally reversed a summary
judgment for the defendant based on a straightforward application of
the target area test. The basis of the reversal was the Ninth Circuit's
affirmation of the policy favoring vigorous enforcement of the antitrust
laws, especially in the context of alleged price-fixing, an antitrust violation that frequently goes undetected by its victims. 42 The dissent agreed
that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the alleged boycott, but
strenuously took issue with his standing to attack the conspiracy to fix
prices and allocate sales, since the plaintiff was neither a competitor
nor a consumer in the relevant market.
One month after Ostrofe I was decided, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, in an opinion essentially along the lines of the dissent in
Ostrofe I, reached a contrary conclusion using the more traditional
target area analysis. In Bichan v. Chemetron Corp.,4 3 the court held
that a president of a company who had been fired because he refused
to adhere to a conspiracy to fix prices and allocate customers lacked
Section 4 standing.
Following Associated General, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Bichan,'" and vacated and remanded Ostrofe L" On remand in Ostrofe, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior holding in a
tortuously reasoned opinion, relying essentially upon "Associated General

39.
40.
41.
42.
(1982).
43.
44.
45.

460
704
670
See

U.S. 1007, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
F.2d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982).
Conley, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Antitrust, 43 La. L. Rev. 283

681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982).
460 U.S. 1016, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
460 U.S. 1007, 103 S. Ct. 1244 (1983).
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read in light of Blue Shield."'46 It reasoned that the Court's extension
in Blue Shield of the right to sue persons whose injury is a "necessary
step" and the "means" employed by the conspirators to achieve their
anticompetitive end provided a basis for recognizing Ostrofe's right to
sue, even though he was neither a competitor nor a consumer.
Judge Kennedy again strongly dissented, accusing the majority of
disregarding the Supreme Court's mandate to reconsider based on Associated General. "We should instead read Blue Shield in light of the
limitations placed on it by Associated General, the case we were instructed to consult. 4 7 The dissent reasoned that the problem with the
plaintiff's claim for treble damages based on alleged Orice-fixing was
that the measure of his damages did not reflect or respond to the
breakdown in competition caused by the antitrust violation. By their
nature, the plaintiff's damages would be the same regardless of the
success of the price-fixing conspiracy. By contrast, the damages sought
in a price-fixing suit are proportionate to the degree the conspiracy is
successful. The dissent concluded that "[a]ntitrust enforcement becomes
divorced from antitrust policy when treble damages bear no relation to
the anticompetitive effects of the illegal conduct. Such awards threaten
'48
to make every business tort convertible into a treble-damage bonanza.
Other Courts of Appeals confronting the standing question since Associated General have generally rejected the prior standing tests and
implementated the new multifactor analysis. 49 In two opinions handed
down the same day, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgments for defendants based on lack of standing. In Transource
International, Inc. v. Trinity Industries, Inc.,50 plaintiff procurer and
lessor of railcars sued defendant manufacturer of railcars after a proposed joint venture to market gondolas fell through. The plaintiff contended that the non-competition clause in the agreement between the
parties violated the antitrust laws.
The Fifth Circuit noted that "it is clear in this case that the plaintiff
met the 'target market' aspect of the standing test."'" However, although
the plaintiff alleged injury, i.e., increased cost of railcars, elimination
from the market, and loss of sales, it failed to allege a sufficient causal
relationship between the injury and the antitrust violation. The court

46. 740 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 749 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 751 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
49. But see Construction Aggregate Transp., Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d
752, 762 n.23 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that McCready implicitly sanctioned continued
flexible use of the target area test).
50. 725 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 280.
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reasoned that there was absolutely no allegation that the plaintiff had
had any opportunity to manufacture or market railcars or gondolas with
which the non-competitor clause could have interfered.
The plaintiff in Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper Co.52 was a
wholesaler and distributor of soft drinks, most notably Pepsi-Cola and
Seven-Up, in the area of Lake Charles and Jennings, Louisiana. The
defendants were the manufacturers of Dr. Pepper, and a Louisiana
wholesaler and distributor of Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper in the same
area as the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that a former distributor of
Dr. Pepper had orally committed to sell to the plaintiff, but had sold
to the defendant instead. The district court granted summary judgment
to the defendants based on lack of antitrust injury. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the plaintiff's failure to acquire the franchise did
not constitute an antitrust injury."
In Crimpers Promotions, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 54 the court
held that it was "compelled . . . to follow the approaches adumbrated
by the Supreme Court in McCready and Associated General without
concern whether the results are consistent with language in earlier Second
Circuit cases."" Plaintiff cable television producer sued defendants Home
Box Office and Showtime Entertainment Corp., dominant producers in
the market, alleging that they had conspired to cause a boycott of its
trade show. Meticulously applying each of the factors listed in Associated
'5 6
General, the court held that the case presented "a paradigm of standing.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Southaven Land Co. v. Malone
& Hyde, Inc.57 rejected its prior "zone of interests" test as too broad
in light of Associated General. In Southaven, the plaintiff, a lessor of
commercial space restricted to retail grocery use, sued defendant lessee
who had subleased space to a grocery store that went bankrupt. The
defendant was also a retail grocer in other areas and refused either to
sublease the space again or to cancel the lease. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant intentionally sought to monopolize and control the
retail grocery market. The complaint failed to. aver that the plaintiff
sustained any injury as a competitor, purchaser, consumer, or other
economic actor in the grocery industry. The Sixth Circuit denied standing
to the plaintiff, although it had clearly alleged a causal connection
between its injury and an antitrust violation and that the defendant
intended to cause that injury. If anything, this case presents a paradigm
of lack of antitrust standing.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1984).
Id.at 304.
724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 293.
Id.at 297.
715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Antitrust Injury
The concept of antitrust injury has been the elusive subject of
numerous opinions." It originated in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc.,59 where the Court held that to recover treble damages under
Section 4, plaintiffs must prove injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. Prior to Associated General, it was unclear how
this requirement related to the more traditional tests for standing. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, merely stated that it was
an additional requirement.6
Following Associated General, it appears that the requirement of
antitrust injury is not an isolated requirement, but rather is subsumed
into the multifactor standing analysis, 6' more particularly, the factor of
2
the nature or type of the plaintiff's alleged injury.6
STATE ACTION IMMUNITY

The doctrine of state action immunity stems from the Supreme
Court's decision in Parker v. Brown, 63 holding that nothing in the
language or history of the Sherman Act suggests that it was intended
to apply to anticompetitive state activity. The Constitution provides that
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract
from their authority. Therefore, absent a clear indication from Congress,
the Court found states to be entitled to immunity. The judicial debate
over the boundaries of this immunity continues unchecked.
The doctrine has proven easy to apply where the specific anticompetitive activity is directed by the state legislature or the state supreme
court. Problems have arisen where the state delegates general authority
to entities such as municipalities and bar associations, which in turn
engage in allegedly anticompetitive activity. To date, the Court has
applied the same standards to private and public "delegates," regarding
each simply as a "non-sovereign" entity. The repercussions for local
governments have proved grave.
In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,6 the Court

58. Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1983).
59. 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S. Ct. 690, 697 (1977).
60. Chrysler Corp. v. Feders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1981).
61. Associated General, 459 U.S. at 535-46, 103 S. Ct. at 907-13.
62. See Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr Pepper Co., 725 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1984);
Chelson v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 715 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1983); McDonald
v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1984). But see Walker v. U-Haul Co.
of Mississippi, 747 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that issues of antitrust standing
and antitrust injury should be considered separately).
63. 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307 (1943).
64. 435 U.S. 389, 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
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declined to extend the Parker immunity to cities "simply by their status
as such." '65 Parkerimmunity will apply only where anticompetitive conduct is undertaken by a city pursuant to a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed" 66 state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly service. Following City of Lafayette, the Court
held that a general delegation of home rule authority to a city authorizing
it to act in one or more particular areas does not render anticompetitive
conduct undertaken by a city pursuant to that authority immune from
antitrust challenge. "A State that allows its municipalities to do as they
please can hardly be said to have 'contemplated' the specific anticom67
petitive actions for which municipal liability is sought."
In CaliforniaRetail Liquor DealersAssociation v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. ,68 the petitioners challenged price schedules set by private wine
wholesalers. Although a state statute specifically authorized this activity,
the state retained no direct control over the wine prices. Absent "active
state supervision" 69 of activity clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, the Supreme Court held that such activity would
not be immunized under the Parker doctrine.
Over thirty-five states have made provisions for home-rule powers
either through legislation or by constitution.7 0 The foregoing line of cases
has caused widespread concerns over the continued viability of local
governmental autonomy. These concerns are clearly warranted. Recently,
a jury verdict of $28.5 million was rendered against a county, village,
and three individuals based on their refusal to permit the connection
of sewer lines to the plaintiffs' proposed development. 7' An en banc
panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed itself and
reinstated a jury verdict of $6.3 million against the City of Houston
and former Houston officials in a case involving a scheme to divide
72
the Houston market among cable franchise operators.
The majority of lower court decisions, however, mirror municipality
concern for the continued viability of local autonomy. Where a city's
mandate is more specific than a broad home-rule power, lower courts
have bent over backwards to shield allegedly anticompetitive municipal

65. Id. at 413, 98 S. Ct. at 1137.
66. Id. at 410, 97 S. Ct. at 1135.
67. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55, 102 S.
Ct. 835, 843 (1982).
68. 445 U.S. 97, 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
69. Id at 105, 100 S. Ct. at 943.
70. See Note, Home Rule and the Sherman Act after Boulder: Cities Between a Rock
and a Hard Place, 49 Brooklyn L. Rev. 259, 262 n.24 (1983).
71. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 579 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1984); accord
Vickery Manor Serv. Corp. v. Village of Mundelein, 575 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Il1. 1983).
72. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984).
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conduct from liability under the Sherman Act, reasoning that 73the city
was acting in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy.
In Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan
Solid Waste Agency, 74 several neighboring municipalities entered into a
cooperative arrangement to construct a waste disposal facility. This
cooperative effort was permitted under a new Iowa statute authorizing
political subdivisions of the state to join together to provide important
and necessary services and facilities, including the provision of sanitary
disposal projects. A private waste disposal service sued, alleging an
exclusionary restraint of trade and monopolization of the disposal of
solid waste. The district court found that the alleged anticompetitive
arrangement was protected by the state action exemption.
The Eighth Circuit easily found a clear state policy encouraging
cities to join together to provide common disposal facilities. It went on
to observe that,
[aidmittedly, one must engage in some speculation to determine
whether the State of Iowa genuinely intended to displace competition in the disposal of solid waste. We agree with the district
court, however, that notwithstanding the statutes' silence on the
specific matter of monopolization, it is possible to infer the
existence of an affirmative state policy permitting anticompetitive
75
practices in the operation of municipal landfills.
Thus, the Court concluded that "the restraint on competition was a
'necessary or reasonable consequence' of engaging in the authorized
activity of contructing a waste disposal facility .... -76A critical fact
in the Court's analysis was that the state legislature had specifically
considered and addressed the problem of waste disposal, unlike the case
in Boulder, where the home rule provision in the Colorado constitution
failed even to mention cable television.
The plaintiff contended alternatively that even if the alleged restraint
was pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy, the defendants' anticompetitive conduct still was not immunized
from antitrust scrutiny because it was not actively supervised by the
State. The Eighth Circuit correctly observed that the Supreme Court
has not decided whether the active state supervision requirement announced in Midcal, involving a private restraint, also applies to anticompetitive activities of municipal governments. In Central Iowa, the
73. See, e.g., Gold Cross Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005
(8th Cir. 1983); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
74.
75.
76.

715 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
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Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its position that it does not where the restraint
represents governmental conduct in an area of "traditional" municipal
activity. The rationale and holding of the Central Iowa case has recently
been adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case with
77
similar facts.
In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,78 the court
ruled that the City's refusal to renew the plaintiff's taxicab franchise
was shielded from antitrust attack by the Parker doctrine. The Ninth
Circuit found that the California Constitution and the state public utility
code contained a state policy to displace competition in this area with
regulation, and also demonstrated that the legislature had contemplated
the kind of actions alleged to be anticompetitive. Aligning itself with
other courts, the Ninth Circuit further held that the city need not show
active state supervision to invoke immunity since in franchising local
public transportation utilities and regulating their charges, the city was
performing a traditional municipal function under a clearly established
and affirmatively expressed state policy:
The state legislature has determined that public transportation
by taxicab should be regulated and that preferably the regulation
should be handled by local government. A requirement of active
state supervision would erode local autonomy. It makes little
sense to require a state to invest its limited resources in supervisory functions that are best left to muncipalities.7 9
Some of the questions left unanswered after Boulder should soon
be answered by the Supreme Court, which has granted a petition for
80
certiorari in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.
In Hallie, the court
upheld the Parker exemption for a municipality that had conditioned
extension of sewer service on annexation. A state statute provided that
services could be refused if an adjoining area elected not to become
annexed. The Seventh Circuit refused to apply the second prong of the
Midcal test, the requirement of active state, supervision, reasoning that
this requirement was unnecessary where a city is performing traditional
municipal functions.
A distinction based on private versus municipal activity has little, if
any, support in the Supreme Court's previous decisions. Nonsovereign
entities, whether private or public, do not share the states' constitutional
immunity. The Parker doctrine is ostensibly based upon precepts of
federalism and the judicial branch's deference to constitutional state

77.
78.
79.
80.

Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 742 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1984).
726 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1434.
700 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 3508 (1984).
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sovereignty in the absence of explicit congressional mandate.81 The decisions of the lower courts largely reflect a disinclination to intrude the
federal nose into local governmental decision making, whether state or
municipal, a position fundamentally at odds with the Supreme Court's
holding that there is no constitutional basis for extending the sovereignty
afforded the states to municipalities.
Congress recently adopted the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984 (the Act) in order to ease the plight of local governments and
breathe life back into municipal autonomy.8 2 In the Senate Report on
Senate Bill 1578 (the senate version of the Act), the Committee reported
that it had monitored the impact of Lafayette and Boulder on the
operation of local government, and learned that more than one hundred
federal antitrust suits seeking treble damages are now pending against
cities, counties, townships and virtually every other type of local government. It further observed that dozens of local government activities
are being challenged, ranging from zoning decisions to the regulation
of garbage collection, airport concessions, and parking lots. "The practical impact of Boulder and Lafayette has been to paralyze the decisionmaking functions of local government. '83
Senate Bill 1578 does not place municipalities on a par with states
insofar as antitrust immunity is concerned; rather, it (1) flatly prohibits
any award of damages against units of local governments under Section
4 of the Clayton Act, and (2) defines the circumstances under which
private parties acting pursuant to the direction of local government can
claim a parallel exemption. The sole private remedy against a local
government violating the federal antitrust laws would be injunctive relief.
House Bill 6027 also eliminates antitrust damage liability for official
conduct of a local government and its officials. Essentially, both bills
would eliminate certain damage suits under the Clayton Act without
altering judicial interpretation of the substantive antitrust law.
CONTRACTS,

COMBINATIONS AND CONSPIRACIES UNDER

In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube

Corp.,84

SECTION 1

the Supreme

Court re-examined the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in the context

of an alleged conspiracy between a parent corporation and its whollyowned subsidiary. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice

81.

City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light, 455 U.S. at 400, 98 S. Ct. at

1130.

82. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 2750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36).
83. S. Rep. No. 593, 98th cong., 2d. Sess. (1984), reprinted in 47 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1179, at 379 (Aug. 23, 1984).
84. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
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Burger and joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, held that two such related entities are incapable of conspiring with
one another within the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice White did not participate in the consideration or
decision of the case.
As the original plaintiff, Independence filed suit based on an alleged
conspiracy between Copperweld and a wholly-owned subsidiary company.
The complaint alleged that Copperweld and its subsidiary, Regal Tube
Company, had conspired to enforce a non-competition clause in a manner
which violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The jury found that
Copperweld and Regal had conspired to violate Section I of the Sherman
Act, and accordingly awarded treble damages in excess of $7.5 million,
as well as attorney's fees and costs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that liability was appropriate "when there is enough separation between
the two entities to make treating them as two independent actors sensible. '"" The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The significance of Copperweld lies in the majority's conservative
analysis of the Sherman Act's prohibition against anti-competitive conspiracies, which led it ultimately to conclude that these parties were
incapable of conspiring illegally under Section 1 of the Sherman Act."6
In repudiating the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, Justice Burger's
opinion focused on a "basic distinction between concerted and independent action." '8 7 The Chief Justice reasoned that this distinction is
the fundamental difference between Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.
By concentrating on the requirement under Section 1 that the anti-

competitive actions be undertaken by two separate entities, the Court
has effectively established a per se rule of antitrust immunity for a

parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary. In concluding that entities so
related should be viewed as a single enterprise within the meaning of
Section 1, Chief Justice Burger said that agreements between such entities
"do not suddenly bring together economic power that was previously
pursuing divergent goals." 88 The Court stated that the coordinated ac-

tivity of a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary must be viewed as
85. 691 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit also held that the jury
instructions took account of the proper factors in determining how much separation
Copperweld and Regal actually maintained in the conduct of their businesses. Id. at 319.
86. It is noteworthy that the antitrust division of the Justice Department filed an
amicus curiae brief in which it took the position that the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine should be rejected.
87. 104 S.Ct. at 2740 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S.Ct.
1464, 1469 (1984)).
88.

104 S. Ct. at 2741.
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that of a single enterprise for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, because their objectives are common and based on a unity of
purpose. The majority also noted that the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores the
reality, thereby posing the danger that overbroad condemnation under
Section 1 could "deprive 8consumers
of the efficiencies that decentralized
9
management may bring."
The majority acknowledged that the Court's holding clearly demonstrated that the Sherman Act does not prohibit a single firm's anticompetitive conduct which does not constitute threatened monopolization, but may be indistinguishable in economic effect from the conduct
of two firms that would be subject to Section 1 liability. Chief Justice
Burger addressed this issue by stating that Congress left such a "gap"
so as to avoid subjecting a single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny
for reasonableness that might ultimately "discourage the competitive
enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote. '90 Burger stated
that regardless of the wisdom of such a distinction, the Act's plain
language "leaves no doubt that Congress made a purposeful choice to
accord different treatment to unilateral and concerted conduct."'"
In a carefully reasoned dissent, Justice Stevens articulated his belief
that the majority had overstepped its position in applying a per se rule
of antitrust immunity. In arguing that the Court would be better advised
to continue to rely on the rule of reason, Justice Stevens further stated
that the majority opinion was actually an unjustified abandonment of
binding Supreme Court precedent which has consistently upheld the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. 92 Justice Stevens criticized the holding
that agreements between parent and subsidiary corporations involve merely
unilateral conduct as contrary to the Supreme Court's traditional understanding of the concept of a combination or conspiracy, and also
as contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the Sherman Act. In support
of this position, Justice Stevens cited the Congressional Record as evidence that the enactors of the Sherman Act were concerned with activities
of combinations between such interrelated entities.
While acknowledging the potential efficiencies associated with corporate integrations of this type, Justice Stevens noted that the Court's
89. Id. at 2742. Chief Justice Burger noted that "[sleparate incorporation may improve
management, avoid special tax problems arising from multistate operations, or serve other
legitimate interests." Id. at 2743. In a footnote, he noted that separate incorporation may
reduce federal or state taxes, facilitate compliance with regulatory or reporting laws, and
may also improve local identification. Further, different parts of a business may require
different pension or profit-sharing plans or different accounting practices. Id. at 2743
n.20.
90. Id. at 2744.
91. Id.
92. "Thus, the rule announced today is inconsistent with what this Court has held
on at least seven previous occasions." Id. at 2748 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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per se rule of immunity leaves a significant gap in antitrust enforcement.
Justice Stevens argued that the Court's holding, by elevating form over
substance, ignored the fundamental economic policy against unlawful
acquisition of market power underlying the Sherman Act.9 3 The dissent
maintained that the majority opinion should not have considered why
a wholly-owned subsidiary should be treated differently from a corporate
division; instead, it maintained that the question should be,
why two corporations that engage in a predatory course of
conduct which produces a market-wide restraint on competition
and which, as separate legal entities, can be easily fit within
the language of Section 1, would be immunized from liability
because they are controlled by the same godfather. That is a
94
question the Court simply fails to confront.
In a case which is perhaps most noteworthy for what it did not
decide, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,9 5 the Supreme Court
held that proof of a manufacturer's termination of a distributor following
complaints on behalf of competing distributors is not in itself sufficient
to support an inference of concerted action under Section I of the
Sherman Act. Although the Court's actual holding only resolved this
narrow evidentiary question, the original defendant (Monsanto) had
further argued against the impropriety of applying a per se standard
based on mere allegations that non-price restrictions, normally subject96
to the rule of reason under Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
are actually an integral part of a price conspiracy.
The Solicitor General, as well as several other amici, took the position
that the Supreme Court should reconsider whether concerted action to
fix resale prices should always be considered unlawful. These non-parties
maintained that the difference between the economic effects of resale
price maintenance and non-price restrictions is minimal. In a footnote
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, declined to consider the argument that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing
conspiracy because neither of the parties had ever raised this contention
97
previously.

93. Stevens has defined market power as the ability to raise prices above those that
would be charged in a competitive market. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
104 S. Ct. 1551, 1566 n.46 (1984).
94. 104 S. Ct. at 2755 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
96. 433 U.S. 36, 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
97. In a footnote which underscores the majority's discomfort with addressing this
argument in the case before it, Justice Powell stated:
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argument.
This case was tried on per se instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in
the District Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing
conspiracy, nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this
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In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma," a
case which generated widespread public interest, the Supreme Court held
that the NCAA's plan for the televising of college football games for
its member institutions during the years 1982 through 1985 violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Justice Stevens wrote for the majority,
joined by Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and
O'Connor. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion which Justice Rehnquist joined.
The district court had concluded that competition in the "live college
football television market" had been restrained in three ways: (1) the
NCAA fixed the price for particular football telecasts; (2) its exclusive
network contracts were tantamount to a group boycott of all of potential
broadcasters, and its threat of sanctions against its own members constituted a threatened boycott of potential competitors; and (3) the plan
placed an artificial limit on the production of televised college football. 99
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for modification of the injunctive decree, holding that the plan constituted per
se illegal price-fixing, and that even if not illegal per se, the plan's
anticompetitive limitations on price and output could not be justified
on the basis of its allegedly pro-competitive effects when all the circumstances were considered.' °°
The Supreme Court affirmed. Although the majority acknowledged
that application of a per se standard was inappropriate in this particular
case because of industry characteristics in which horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all, 0' the
Court nonetheless decided under the rule of reason that the challenged
restraints constituted horizontal price-fixing and output limitations which
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The majority opinion concluded
that the NCAA did possess market power, which was defined as the
ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive
market. 10 2 The Court thus agreed that the lower courts were correct in
finding a significant restraint upon the operation of a free market, and

Court presses the argument advanced by amici. We therefore decline to reach
the question, and we decide the case in the context in which it was decided
below and argued here.
104 S,Ct. at 1469-70 n.7.
98. 104 S, Ct. 2948 (1984).
99. 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1293-95 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
100. 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983).
101, 104 S. Ct, at 2960-61.
102,
Petitioner's argument that it cannot obtain supracompetitive prices from
broadcasters since advertisers, and hence broadcasters, can switch from college
football to other types of programming simply ignores the findings of the District
Court. It found that intercollegiate football telecasts generate an audience uniquely
attractive to advertisers and that competitors are unable to offer programming
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proceeded to examine the NCAA's proffered justifications.
The NCAA argued that its television plan constituted a cooperative
joint venture which assisted in the marketing of broadcast rights, and
hence was pro-competitive. The Court rejected this argument outright,
relying primarily on the district court's contrary findings that the production of televised collegiate football had been significantly limited.
The Court also rejected the argument that the plan provided an attractive
package sale which was necessary to penetrate the market, stating that
broadcasting rights to collegiate football constituted a unique product
for which there was no substitute, and therefore there is no need for collective action to facilitate competition against a non-existent competitor.
Similarly, the Court rejected the argument that the NCAA's television
plan protected live attendance as contrary to the factual conclusions of
the district court. The Court also rejected this argument because it essentially proposed that competition between televised football and live football is itself unreasonable, a justification clearly inconsistent with the basic
policy of the Sherman Act.' 3
Perhaps the most significant justification set forth by the NCAA was
that its television plan promoted a competitive balance among the football programs of its various member institutions. Although the Court
acknowledged that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance
among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important, the majority
rejected the NCAA's arguments that the restraints contained in its television plan could be justified as serving that interest. The Court based
this conclusion in large part on the district court's determination that
more games would be televised absent the NCAA's restrictions, thereby
conclusively establishing that the plan could not be defended on this
basis. ,04
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White took issue with the Court's
treatment of intercollegiate athletics under the NCAA's control "as a
purely commercial venture in which colleges and universities participate
solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits."'' 5 The dissent
that can attract a similar audience. These findings amply support its conclusion
that the NCAA possesses market power. Indeed, the District Court's subsidiary
finding that advertisers will pay a premium price per viewer to reach audiences
watching college football because of their demographic characteristics is vivid
evidence of the uniqueness of this product.
104 S. Ct. at 2966.
103. 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
104. "The hypothesis that legitimates the maintenance of competitive balance as a
procompetitive justification under the Rule of Reason is that equal competition will
maximize consumer demand for the product." The Court thus concluded that the district
court's finding that more games would be televised absent the NCAA's controls was a
"compelling demonstration that they do not in fact serve any such legitimate purpose,"
104 S. Ct. at 2970.
105. 104 S. Ct. at 2971 (White, J. dissenting).
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disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the NCAA's television plan
differed fundamentally from other apparently anti-competitive aspects
of the organization's program of self-regulation. In a concise summary
of the majority holding, Justice White noted that neither the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court purported to hold that the NCAA may
not: (1) require its members who televise their games to pool and share
the compensation received with other schools and with the NCAA; (2)
limit the number of times any member may arrange to have its games
shown on television; or (3) enforce reasonable blackout rules to avoid
head-to-head competition for television audiences."'°
Justice White viewed these limitations on the Court's holding as
significant, and stated that the majority merely reaffirmed the Court of
Appeals' judgment that the NCAA may not limit the number of games
that are broadcast, and that it may not contract for an overall price
that ultimately has the effect of setting the price for individual game
broadcast rights.107 Further, Justice White questioned whether the district
court employed the proper measure of output by distinguishing between
output reflected in an increased number of games shown, and output
measured in terms of total viewership of collegiate football; he maintained that the latter is "the more appropriate measure of output, or,
0 8
at least, of the claimed anti-competitive effects of the NCAA plan."'
Another interesting point raised in the dissent concerned the majority's
conclusion that the reduction in the number of televised college football
games brought about by the NCAA's plan resulted in an anti-competitive
increase in the price of television rights. Justice White stated that reductions in output by monopolists in most product markets enable
producers to exact a higher price for the same product; however, Justice
White reasoned that the NCAA had created a new product-exclusive
television rights-that are "more valuable to networks than the products
that its individual members could market independently."'0 9 He thus
reasoned that the focus on higher prices for television rights, as opposed
to a consideration of the nature and quality of the product delivered

106. Id. at 2974.
107. The dissent concluded: "At the very least, the Court of Appeals should be directed
to vacate the injunction . . . to accomodate the substantial remaining authority of the
NCAA to regulate the telecasting of its members' football games." Id. at 2979.
108. Id. at 2975. The dissent further stated:
This is the NCAA's position, and it seems likely to me that the television plan,
by increasing network coverage at the expense of local broadcasts, actually
expands the total television audience for NCAA football. . . . In the absence
of a contrary finding by the District Court, I cannot conclude that respondents
carried their burden of showing that the television plan has an adverse effect
on output and is therefore anticompetitive.
Id.
109. Id.at 2976.
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by the NCAA and its member institutions, "may well have deemed anticompetitive a rise in price that more properly should be attributed to
an increase in output, measured in terms of viewership." ' 01 Justice White
also disputed the majority's conclusion that the uniqueness of NCAA
football renders collective action to facilitate competition against "nonexistent competitors" unnecessary. To the contrary, the dissent concluded
that the maintenance or enhancement of the quality of NCAA football
telecasts might well be necessary to enable those telecasts to compete
effectively against other forms of entertainment, suggesting that the
relevant market should be broadened to include other forms of entertainment. Finally, the dissent argued that the plan fosters the goal of
amateurism by spreading revenues among various schools and reducing
the financial incentives towards professionalism.
TIE-INS

In a controversial case which arose in Louisiana, the Supreme Court
recently considered the propriety of applying the per se rule of illegality
to tying arrangements challenged under federal antitrust laws. In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,"' the Court unanimously
agreed that an exclusive contract for the provision of medical services
between a group of anesthesiologists and a hospital did not constitute
a per se violation of Section I of the Sherman Act. But in a five to
four split, the members of the Court differed as to whether the per se
rule should be employed in assessing the legality of such an agreement.
The plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, applied for admission to the medical staff of East Jefferson Hospital. Although his admission was approved by two medical committees at the hospital, the plaintiff's
application was denied by the hospital board of directors because of an
exclusive contract for anesthesiology services between the hospital and
a professional medical corporation of anesthesiologists. The plaintiff
commenced an action in the federal district -court for the Eastern District
of New Orleans in which he asserted that the exclusive contract constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Following trial on the merits, the district court dismissed
the plaintiff's suit. In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the agreement was illegal per se, the judge ruled that the plaintiff had not shown
that East Jefferson Hospital dominated the market in which it competed.
Furthermore, the court found that the essential purpose of the exclusive
2
contract was to enhance patient care.1

110.

Ill.
112.

Id.
104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
513 F. Supp. 532, 541 (E.D. La. 1981).
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The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the exclusive contract constituted a tying arrangement which was illegal per se." s In concluding
that East Jefferson Hospital had sufficient market power in the tying
product (general hospital services and operating room facilities) to coerce
the purchase of the tied product (anesthesiological services), the Fifth
Circuit relied upon the rationale that hospital patients tend to choose
hospitals by location rather than price or quality. In addition to holding
that East Jefferson Hospital possessed sufficient market power under
this analysis, the Fifth Circuit also concluded that the arrangement had
anti-competitive effects, notwithstanding the asserted business justifications for the contract.
Although the Supreme Court reversed and unanimously concluded
that the contract did not constitute a per se illegal tying arrangement,
the Court split on the important question of what standard should be
applied in assessing the legality of an arrangement which has been
challenged as an illegal tie-in. Writing for five members of the Court,
Justice Stevens declared that a per se analysis is the appropriate standard
14
by which such an arrangement should be considered.'
Relying on the holding in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States,"5' the majority in Hyde reaffirmed that the essential characteristic
of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its
control over the tying product to force the buyer to purchase another
product which he did not want, or which he might have preferred to
purchase elsewhere on different terms. The question of whether there
is one integrated product or two separate products turns "not on the
functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the
demand for the two items," i.e., whether there are two distinguishable
product markets.' 6 Further, the critical element of "forcing" is essential
to an illegal tying arrangement. The majority opinion states that in
order to find that a particular tying arrangement constitutes a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, it must be demonstrated that forcing is
probable, and that anti-competitive effects are a definite probability.
While adhering to the per se rule for scrutinizing tying arrangments,
the majority focused on a study of the market in which each of the
two products were sold. Although the Court concluded that the hospital
did offer two distinct products, Justice Stevens concluded on a review
of the record, that East Jefferson Hospital did not possess sufficient

113.

686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982).

114. Justice Stephens stated that "It is far too late in the history of our antitrust
jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an 'unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonbable 'per se."' 104 S.
Ct. at 1556.
115. 345 U.S. 594, 73 S. Ct. 872 (1953).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 1562.
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market power in the relevant geographical market to force patients to
purchase its package of hospital and anesthesiological services. Without
proof of the essential element of forcing, the Court held that the
'7
arrangement did not constitute a per se illegal tying arrangement."
The majority also held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that
the exclusive contract unreasonably restrained competition among anesthesiologists because even without the exclusive contract at East Jefferson
Hospital, the patient's choice of doctors would nonetheless be substantially curtailed by the nature of the service and the hospital's unquestioned right to determine the identity and number of doctors to whom
it accords staff privileges. The Court held that there had been no showing
on the record that the market for services of anesthesiologists as a whole
had been adversely affected by the exclusive contract between East
Jefferson Hospital and the medical corporation. In the absence of a
showing that the market for anesthesiological services had been adversely
affected by the exclusive contract, the Court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The Hyde decision is perhaps most noteworthy for the concurring
opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Burger, Powell, and
Rehnquist. In a novel and substantially different approach from the
majority's analysis, Justice O'Connor said that the exclusive arrangement
between East Jefferson Hospital and the anesthesiologists should be
analyzed under the rule of reason. Justice O'Connor noted that the per
se doctrine in tying cases had always required an elaborate inquiry into
the economic effects of the tying arrangement; therefore, the application
of the "per se" label was not appropriate. The concurring opinion
sought to refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects and any
potential benefits that the tying arrangement might have."' Significantly,
Justice O'Connor's opinion dismissed the notion of "forcing," essential
117. In concluding that the anticompetitive effects of the agreement in question did
not warrant per se condemnation, the majority stated:
There is, however, insufficient evidence in this record to provide a basis for
finding that the Roux contract, as it actually operates in the market, has
unreasonably restrained competition. The record sheds little light on how this
arrangement affected consumer demand for separate arrangements with a specific
anesthesiologist. The evidence indicates that some surgeons and patients preferred
respondent's services to those of Roux, but there is no evidence that any patient
who was sophisticated enough to know the difference between two anesthesiologists was not also able to go to a hospital that would provide him with
the anesthesiologist of his choice.
104 S. Ct. at 1567-68.
118. The law of the tie-ins will thus be brought into accord with the law applicable
to all other allegedly anticompetitive economic arrangements, except for those
few horizontal or quasi-horizontal restraints that can be said to have no economic
justification whatsoever. The change will rationalize rather than abandon tie-in
doctrine as it is already applied.
104 S. Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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to the majority opinion, as irrelevant to proper analysis of a tying
arrangement. " 9
There is little question after Hyde that the courts will often be
required to engage in a detailed analysis of a defendant's market position
when a tying arrangement is challenged under the Sherman Act, even
though a per se standard will be applied. Hyde may represent a crossroads in, the Supreme Court's analysis of tying arrangements generally,
and perhaps suggests a retreat from the rigid application of a per se
rule. Although the Hyde majority advocated the retention of the per se
analysis in scrutinizing tying arrangements, its overall approach seems
more akin to a rule of reason analysis. One vote currently separates
the two sides of the court on fundamentally distinct approaches to this
problem. The law on tie-ins continues to evolve on a case-by-case basis.
Several Circuit Court opinions rendered subsequent to Hyde indicate
some potential problems which remain in analyzing the legality of tying
arrangements. In Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical
Center, 20 the Second Circuit also addressed the antitrust consequences
of a contract between a hospital and a professional corporation for the
practice of anesthesiology. The plaintiff, an anesthesiologist, alleged that
the defendants had, with respect to providing anesthesiology services in
the hospital, engaged in unlawful price-fixing (both vertical and horizontal), group boycott, tying, monopolization, and conspiracy and attempt to monopolize.
In affirming the district court's directed verdict dismissing the plaintiff's claims, the Second Circuit noted several factual reasons for concluding that the contract at issue was not illegal under the antitrust
laws. In analyzing the terms of the contract, the court observed that
there was no evidence of any attempt to exclude the plaintiff or any
other physician from the practice of anesthesiology at the hospital. To
the contrary, the court focused on the fact that the hospital and the
professional corporation had negotiated with the plaintiff as an equal

119. Justice O'Connor's emphasis on analyzing the actual competitive effects of such
an arrangement underscores a fundamental dispute concerning the significance of "forcing:"
The ultimate decision whether a tie-in is illegal under the antitrust laws should
depend upon the demonstrated economic effects of the challenged agreement.
It may, for example, be entirely innocuous that the seller exploits its control
over the tying product to "force" the buyer to purchase the tied product. For
when the seller exerts market power only in the tying product market, it makes
no difference to him or his customers whether he exploits that power by raising
the price of the tying product of by "forcing" customers to buy a tied product.
. . . On the other hand, tying may make the provision of packages of goods
and services more efficient. A tie-in should be condemned only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to efficienty.
Id. at 1574 (citations omitted).
120. 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1984).
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third party to the contract, and the contract itself contained a provision
for subsequent inclusion of Any qualified physicians who might seek to
enter the relevant market for anesthesiological services at a later date.
Moreover, the court noted that the contract called for periodic review
every six months, further evidence of its non-exclusive nature.
In addressing the issue of whether there was an illegal tying arrangement, the Court of Appeals cited the lack of evidence in the record
to indicate the presence of anticompetitive forcing. The decision relied
on Hyde for the proposition that a hospital retains the "unquestioned
right to exercise some control over the identity and number of doctors
to whom it accords staff privileges.' ' 2 1 Although the Second Circuit
acknowledged that a jury question was presented as to whether the
hospital had sufficient market power, the panel concluded that evidence
was lacking to prove that the hospital conditioned the sale of its operating
room facilities on the purchase of anesthesiology services. The nonexclusive underpinnings of the agreement were thus held to be a defense
to the claim that the contract resulted in the anticompetitive forcing
addressed in Hyde, which could result in per se condemnation. The
court dismissed all of the plaintiff's remaining claims as contrary to the
evidence in the record on appeal.
In an interesting post-Hyde tying case, the Ninth Circuit upheld a
finding of per se antitrust liability based on an illegal tying arrangement
involving an intellectual property right. In Digidyne Corp. v. Data
General Corp.,' 22 the Ninth Circuit's application of a per se standard
underscored the significance of the Supreme Court's five to four split
on what analytical rule should be applied.
The plaintiffs brought suit against defendant Data General under
Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act based upon the defendant's refusal
to license its NOVA operating system software except to purchasers of
its NOVA central processing unit. Trial in the district court was limited
to the issue of the defendant's market power and resulted in a jury
verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial was granted, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed and held that the refusal to license constituted an illegal
tying arrangement.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had erroneously
read the Supreme Court's decision in Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel Corp.2 3 as requiring proof of power to fix the price of the
tying product in the whole of the relevant market, as that term is defined

121. Id. at 1015 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
1568 (1984)).
122. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984).
123. 394 U.S. 495, 89 S. Ct. 1252 (1969).
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establish per se illegality, the Ninth Circuit
Citing United States v. Loew's, Inc.,' 2 4
requisite economic power to establish an
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a showing would suffice to
stated that it was not required.
the court concluded that the
illegal tying arrangement may

be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or from

its unique attributes.

25

Such reasoning unquestionably contradicts the

spirit of Hyde, if not its express holding. But perhaps most importantly,
the court relied upon Loew's and Hyde to find a presumption of market
power when a statutorily granted monopoly such as a patent or copyright

is involved. 126 This presumption has been criticized, and Justice O'Connor
labels it a "common misconception.' 27 The court thus looked to whether
anticompetitive forcing was likely by analyzing such power only with
respect to some of the buyers in the relevant market.
In focusing on the uniquely attractive characteristics of the tying

software, the "lock-in" characteristics of a market which required the
defendant's customers to continue purchasing the same product after

the initial purchase for the sake of compatability, and the presumption
of market power associated with a patent or copyright, the Ninth Circuit
held that the anticompetitive leverage presented by an illegal tie-in had
been established. In considering whether "substantial commerce" had
been foreclosed within the meaning of Hyde, 'the court cited Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.121 for the proposition that a
"'substantial volume' in this context means only an amount greater than
de minimis, a requirement clearly satisfied here."' 29
The distinction between application of the per se standard and the
rule of reason advocated in O'Connor's concurrence in Hyde is brought
into sharp focus in a case such as Digidyne. Through the presumption

124.

371 U.S. 38, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).

125. The Court of Appeals, quoting from Loew's, stated:
Since the requisite economic power may be found on the basis of either
uniqueness or consumer appeal, and since market dominance in the present
context does not necessitate a demonstration of market power in the sense of
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, it should seldom be necessary in a tie-in sale case to
embark upon a full-scale factual inquiry into the scope of the relevant market
for the tying [sic] product and into the corollary problem of the seller's percentage
share in that market. This is even more obviously true when the tying product
is patented or copyrighted, in which case, as appears in greater detail below,
sufficiency of economic power is presumed.
734 F.2d at 1340 (quoting United States v. Lowe's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962)).
126. "For example, if the government has granted the seller a patent or similar

monopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product
elsewhere gives the seller market power." Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1560.
127. Id. at 1572 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. 394 U.S. at 501, 89 S. Ct. at 1257-58.
129. 734 F.2d at 1347.
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of market power based upon a product's protection under intellectual
property laws, and reference to the uniquely innovative characteristics
of the tying product, the Ninth Circuit found a per se violation without
any significant analysis of the overall competitive impact on the market
as a whole. This reasoning suggests that the owner of innovative intellectual property which is the result of expensive research and development should consider seeking recovery for those costs through
appropriate pricing, not through arrangements such as that presented
in Digidyne, even though such a distinction may seem insubstantial. It
is apparent that if Justice O'Connor's analysis gains support, what is
now considered a per se antitrust violation might no longer be considered
objectionable at all.
In Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Building, Inc., 30 the
Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Section
I of the Sherman Act alleging an illegal tying arrangement. The case
is noteworthy because Judge Posner's opinion expresses some potential
problems with the "separate markets" test propounded in Hyde. The
Supreme Court's standard foi determining whether the threshold requirement that two separate and distinct products are involved requires
analyzing whether two separate demand markets exist for the products
in question. The Seventh Circuit noted the potential difficulty with this
approach in a case where a trademark is alleged to be the tying product.
The legal question presented was to what extent separate products
are involved when it is alleged that a defendant has tied the use of its
trademark to the sale of a product integrally associated with that trademark, in this case prefabricated housing. Such a basis for finding an
illegal tying arrangement was rejected by the Seventh Circuit on the
grounds that only one product was being offered to the consumer. 3
Posner went on to raise two significant post-Hyde issues with which
the courts will likely struggle: (1) to what extent the "separate markets"

130.
131.

737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984).
In a cogent explanation of a key distinction in the area of alleged trademark

tie-ins, Posner stated:
[Plaintiff's] claim is that the Morton name, the Morton trademark, is the tying
product and the building, the kit of prefabricated building components, is the
tied product. The difficulty with this argument is that a product and its name
are inseparable. It is one thing to say that a manufacturer of copying machines
who requires his customers to buy from him the copying paper that is used in
the machines is conditioning the sale of the machines on the customer's purchase
of a distinct product; it is quite another to say that General Motors lets you
use the name Buick on condition that you buy the car to which the name is
attached. That is a fantastical description of the transaction, and the cases reject
the proposition that a tie-in claim can be based on it.
Id. at 704 (citations omitted).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 45

test will be accepted, and how easy it will be to implement, 32 and (2)
to what extent the Supreme Court's emphasis in Hyde on the importance
of proving that the owner of the tying product has real market power
"may doom the franchise trademark cases, as they mostly involve highly
competitive retail industries, such as the fast-food business."' This last
question may prove especially troublesome when decisions such as Digidyne rely on earlier Supreme Court cases to find a presumption of
market power when intellectual property is the alleged tying product
and further limit consideration of the commerce affected to a deter3 4
mination of whether it is more than de minimis.1
A case such as
Digidyne presents significant questions which will require courts to engage
in a careful balancing of the policies underlying both intellectual property
law and antitrust laws.
PATENT-ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
The interface between patent and antitrust law continues to evolve
as the protection and exploitation of intellectual property assumes greater
importance in the international marketplace. Because the courts are
required to strike a delicate balance between promoting innovation through
the granting of a limited statutory monopoly under the intellectual
property laws, and the equally important protection of price competition
through antitrust enforcement, jurisprudential developments in this area
reflect important policy choices.
It is especially significant that the courts continue to impose a
presumption that the owner of a patent possesses "market power," as
that term is applied in a tie-in context. Although this issue is discussed
more fully in the tie-in section,1 35 it is interesting to note that the Supreme
Court reiterated this presumption in Hyde.136 But in a concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor criticizes the presumption. 3 7 The Supreme Court's five

132. There may be overwhelming economies of joint provision for most customers
and yet enough customers with idiosyncratic demands to encourage small markets
tailored to their needs to emerge, as has happened with ornamental belt buckles.
The separate market for ornamental buckles resembles the separate market for
anesthesia, which exists because a patient can contract separately with the surgeon
and with the anesthesiologist. We doubt that, even after Jefferson Parish [Hyde],
belts are tie-ins of buckles to straps; yet we cannot be sure where the separatemarkets test will lead.
Id.
133. Id.at 705.
134. 734 F.2d at 1347.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 122-29.
136. 104 S. Ct. at 1560.
137. A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright, a high market
share, or a unique product that competitors are not able to offer suffice to
demonstrate market power. While each of these three factors might help to give
market power to a seller,
itisalso possible that a seller
in these situations will
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to four split on this issue evinces a fundamental division within the
Court of great significance to the owners and licensees of intellectual
property alleged to have imposed illegal tying restrictions. 38
An important recent decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals involved allegations of an illegal attempt to monopolize based upon
bad faith institution of a patent infringement suit. In the second appellate
decision arising from the ongoing litigation entitled Handgards, Inc. v.
Ethicon, Inc., 3 9 the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury finding that a violation
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act had been established based on a series
of bad faith patent infringement suits. The Ninth Circuit further upheld
a damage award of $3,297,122 (before trebling), attorneys' fees40 of
$1,064,943, and in excess of $3,000,000 in post-judgment interest.
In Handgards,the plaintiff established facts which constituted "clear
and convinving" proof of the defendant's bad faith. The plaintiff adduced evidence that the patent owner knew of the invalidity of his
patent, thereby demonstrating the bad faith nature of the infringement
suit. The plaintiff proved that the defendant knew that the patented
product had been "on sale" or "in public use" more than .one year
prior to the patent application, thereby invalidating the patent.
Two ancillary points addressed in Handgards are worth mentioning.
First, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the defendant's argument that
the relevant inquiry should be whether its patent attorney knew of the
grounds for invalidity, instead focusing on proof imputing such knowledge to the agents, officers, and directors of Ethicon who were responsible for bringing the infringement suit.' 4' Second, the court
specifically rejected the defendant's argument that the district court's

have no market power; for example, a patent holder has no market power in
any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product. Similarly, a high market share indicates market power only if the market is properly
defined to include all reasonable substitutes for the product ...
Nor does any presumption of market power find support in our prior cases.
Id. at 1572 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 122-29.
139. 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
140. In the first appellate decision in this case, Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601
F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980), the Ninth Circuit reversed
an earlier jury damage award based on what it believed to be an incorrect burden of
proof instruction. In the first decision, the Ninth Circuit held that to establish Section 2
liability, Handgards had to prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that Ethicon had
prosecuted its patent suit in bad faith with specific intent to monopolize the relevant
market, and that a dangerous probability of success existed. 601 F.2d at 994-6. The
second jury award was based on the conclusion that these requirements of proof had
been met.
141. The Court observed that evidence showing that the inventor/patentee/employee
knew of the patent invalidity is "very probative of Ethicon's knowledge." 743 F.2d at
1290 (citation omitted).
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refusal to instruct the jury on Noerr-Pennington immunity, 42 and to
require a finding that the infringement suit constituted a "sham" proceeding effectively deprived the defendant's access to acknowledged antitrust immunity. The Ninth Circuit responded that the good-faith
presumption "affords the equivalent of the Noerr-Pennington immunity
while the requirement of bad faith litigation easily affords the equivalent
of the sham exception," and that such instructions would therefore be
43
merely "duplicative." 1
Another noteworthy development is the passage of the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984,144 commonly referred to as the Joint
Research and Development Act. The act provides that in suits based
on alleged antitrust violations resulting from joint research and development ventures, courts shall apply the rule of reason, impose only
single damages, and permit recovery of attorney's fees by defendants
in certain circumstances. The purpose of the bill is to promote research
and development and to encourage innovation by stripping away unnecessary antitrust obstacles to the legitimate pooling of research and
development resources. This approach is perhaps most important for
projects which may prove too costly or inefficient for an individual firm
to undertake. It is hoped that the competitiveness of U.S. products will
be enhanced in the international marketplace.
MERGERS

On June 14, 1984, the Justice Department issued a new set of
Merger Guidelines and an accompanying policy statement. 45 These
Guidelines state the present enforcement policy of the U.S. Department
of Justice concerning acquisitions and mergers subject to Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.
One of the important advances of the 1982 Guidelines was the
recognition that mergers can enhance efficiency. The 1984 Guidelines
restate this theme even more strongly, stating that "[a]lthough they
sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play an important role

142. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 81 S. Ct. 523 (1961) and United Mine workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 85 S. Ct. 1585 (1965). "Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, bona fide efforts to
obtain or influence legislative, executive, judicial or administrative actions are immune
from antitrust liability (on the basis of the first amendment's guaranteed right to petition]."
Clipper Express v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tarriff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1251
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
143. 743 F.2d at 1294-95.
144. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 1815 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305).
145. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1169 (Spec. Supp. 1984).
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in a free enterprise economy.' ' 46 The 1984 Guidelines also clarify the
"restrictive, somewhat misleading tone" of the prior Guidelines which
had indicated that the Department would consider efficiencies only in
"extraordinary cases.' ' 47 The revisions make it clear that the Department
considers and gives appropriate weight to efficiency claims in all cases
where such claims are established by clear and convincing evidence.
The 1984 Guidelines were considered relevant by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in reversing a judgment after a bench trial that Waste
Management, Inc.'s acquisition of a large competitor violated section 7
of the Clayton Act.' 48 It will be interesting to see how the courts may
strike. down a merger or acquisition in the near future, given the imprimatur such activity has received from the Justice Department.

146. Id.at S-I.
147. Id.at S-16.
148.

United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).

